Investment Reversibility and Agency Cost of Debt

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2008.00838.XMaRDI QIDQ5456472zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gustavo Manso

Publication date 8 April 2008

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00838.x

zbMATH Keywords

real optionsasset substitutiondebt financingdebt overhangagency problemsunderinvestment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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• Credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics
• Sul problema del reimpiego dei margini in operazioni finanziarie
• On the neutrality of debt in investment intensity

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