Approximate Equilibria for Strategic Two Person Games
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Publication:5459968
DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_3zbMATH Open1136.91307OpenAlexW1518510977MaRDI QIDQ5459968FDOQ5459968
Authors: P. G. Spirakis 
Publication date: 2 May 2008
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_3
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Cites Work
- Non-cooperative games
- On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
- Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
- Algorithms, games, and the internet
- Efficient Algorithms for Constant Well Supported Approximate Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
- The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
- On sparse approximations to randomized strategies and convex combinations
- Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
- Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games
- Reducibility among equilibrium problems
- Well Supported Approximate Equilibria in Bimatrix Games: A Graph Theoretic Approach
- A Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Algorithm for Computing a Stationary Point of the General Linear Complementarity Problem
Cited In (8)
- Two-Person Ratio Efficiency Games
- A note on anti-Nash equilibrium for bimatrix game
- Equilibria, fixed points, and complexity classes
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- New algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games
- A two-stage Bertrand-Edgeworth game
- Optimal values and strategies for a particular case of two-person games
- Two game-theoretic problems of approach
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