Approximate Equilibria for Strategic Two Person Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_3zbMath1136.91307OpenAlexW1518510977MaRDI QIDQ5459968

Paul G. Spirakis

Publication date: 2 May 2008

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (3)

A note on anti-Nash equilibrium for bimatrix game ⋮ Equilibria, fixed points, and complexity classes ⋮ New algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games

Cites Work

• Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
• On sparse approximations to randomized strategies and convex combinations
• On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
• Non-cooperative games
• Reducibility among equilibrium problems
• The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
• Well Supported Approximate Equilibria in Bimatrix Games: A Graph Theoretic Approach
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• A Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Algorithm for Computing a Stationary Point of the General Linear Complementarity Problem
• Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
• Efficient Algorithms for Constant Well Supported Approximate Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
• Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games

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