A Proof of Security in O(2 n ) for the Xor of Two Random Permutations
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Publication:5502805
DOI10.1007/978-3-540-85093-9_22zbMATH Open1162.94397OpenAlexW1583969855MaRDI QIDQ5502805FDOQ5502805
Authors: Jacques Patarin
Publication date: 9 January 2009
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85093-9_22
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pseudorandom functionspseudorandom permutationsLuby-Rackoff backwardssecurity beyond the birthday bound
Cites Work
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- A Combinatorial Problem on Abelian Groups
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- Foiling birthday attacks in length-doubling transformations
- The sum of PRPs is a secure PRF
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- A Proof of Security in O(2 n ) for the Xor of Two Random Permutations
- Generic attacks for the Xor of \(k\) random permutations
Cited In (37)
- Luby-Rackoff backwards with more users and more security
- XOR of PRPs in a quantum world
- Cryptanalysis of Round-Reduced $$\mathtt{LED}$$
- Improved multi-user security using the squared-ratio method
- A Proof of Security in O(2 n ) for the Xor of Two Random Permutations
- \textsf{LightMAC}: fork it and make it faster
- How to build fully secure tweakable blockciphers from classical blockciphers
- A note on the chi-square method: a tool for proving cryptographic security
- XPX: generalized tweakable Even-Mansour with improved security guarantees
- The Relation Between CENC and NEMO
- How to build optimally secure PRFs using block ciphers
- Quantum attacks on PRFs based on public random permutations
- XLS is not a strong pseudorandom permutation
- The “Coefficients H” Technique
- Full indifferentiable security of the XOR of two or more random permutations using the \(\chi^2\) method
- Revisiting AES-GCM-SIV: multi-user security, faster key derivation, and better bounds
- Revisiting the indifferentiability of the sum of permutations
- The indistinguishability of the XOR of \(k\) permutations
- Beyond-birthday secure domain-preserving PRFs from a single permutation
- Counter-in-Tweak: Authenticated Encryption Modes for Tweakable Block Ciphers
- EWCDM: An Efficient, Beyond-Birthday Secure, Nonce-Misuse Resistant MAC
- Analysis of the single-permutation encrypted Davies-Meyer construction
- Beyond birthday bound secure fresh rekeying: application to authenticated encryption
- Mind the composition: birthday bound attacks on EWCDMD and SoKAC21
- Proof of mirror theory for a wide range of \(\xi_{\max }\)
- Tight indistinguishability bounds for the XOR of independent random permutations by Fourier analysis
- Mirror theory and cryptography
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Low-memory attacks against two-round Even-Mansour using the 3-XOR problem
- A Proof of Security in O(2 n ) for the Benes Scheme
- Indifferentiability beyond the birthday bound for the xor of two public random permutations
- Tweaking a block cipher: multi-user beyond-birthday-bound security in the standard model
- On the XOR of multiple random permutations
- Random number generators based on permutations can pass the collision test
- Generic attacks for the Xor of \(k\) random permutations
- The summation-truncation hybrid: reusing discarded bits for free
- Multi-user security of the sum of truncated random permutations
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