A Formal Analysis of Complex Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79980-1_14zbMath1170.94330OpenAlexW1586945915MaRDI QIDQ5505422

Chiara Bodei, Han Gao, Pierpaolo Degano

Publication date: 27 January 2009

Published in: Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.adm.unipi.it/2196/1/TR%2D08%2D03.pdf.gz

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (6)

Static Evidences for Attack Reconstruction ⋮ Measuring security in IoT communications ⋮ Security Metrics at Work on the Things in IoT Systems ⋮ Non-repudiation analysis using \textsc{LySa} with annotations ⋮ Pierpaolo Degano ⋮ A Formal Analysis of Complex Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols

Uses Software

• AVISPA

Cites Work

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• A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus
• Validating firewalls using flow logics
• On the security of public key protocols
• A logic of authentication
• Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
• A Formal Analysis of Complex Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
• ZB 2005: Formal Specification and Development in Z and B
• Computer Aided Verification

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