scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3304892
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Publication:5586207
It is not possible, without circularity, to define subjective probabilities in terms of values of goods and attitudes in options, as Ramsey proposed, since the individual cannot compare the mixtures (\(m\) goods of one kind and \(nẞ) of the other) with certainty. There is no distinction of principle between subjective and objective probability. Probabilities are hypothetical in the sense that they can be revised by statistical checks. Probabilities can be assigned to strictly unrepeatable events by analogy. [For the entire collection see Zbl 0128.24101.]
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