Quick anomaly detection by the Newcomb-Benford law, with applications to electoral processes data from the USA, Puerto Rico and Venezuela

DOI10.1214/09-STS296MaRDI QIDQ5963766zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Luis Pericchi, David Torres

Publication date 23 February 2016

Published in Statistical Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.3290, https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ss/1330437932

zbMATH Keywords

Bayes factorsuniversal lower boundelectronic elections\(p\)-value correctionselection forensicsNewcomb-Benford second digit law 2BLquick anomaly detectionrestricted Newcomb-Benford law

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25)

Abstract: A simple and quick general test to screen for numerical anomalies is presented. It can be applied, for example, to electoral processes, both electronic and manual. It uses vote counts in officially published voting units, which are typically widely available and institutionally backed. The test examines the frequencies of digits on voting counts and rests on the First (NBL1) and Second Digit Newcomb--Benford Law (NBL2), and in a novel generalization of the law under restrictions of the maximum number of voters per unit (RNBL2). We apply the test to the 2004 USA presidential elections, the Puerto Rico (1996, 2000 and 2004) governor elections, the 2004 Venezuelan presidential recall referendum (RRP) and the previous 2000 Venezuelan Presidential election. The NBL2 is compellingly rejected only in the Venezuelan referendum and only for electronic voting units. Our original suggestion on the RRP (Pericchi and Torres, 2004) was criticized by The Carter Center report (2005). Acknowledging this, Mebane (2006) and The Economist (US) (2007) presented voting models and case studies in favor of NBL2. Further evidence is presented here. Moreover, under the RNBL2, Mebane's voting models are valid under wider conditions. The adequacy of the law is assessed through Bayes Factors (and corrections of $p$-values) instead of significance testing, since for large sample sizes and fixed $alpha$ levels the null hypothesis is over rejected. Our tests are extremely simple and can become a standard screening that a fair electoral process should pass.

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3029380 (Why is no real title available?)
• A statistical derivation of the significant-digit law
• Base-Invariance Implies Benford's Law
• Calibration of \(\rho \) values for testing precise null hypotheses
• Explaining the uneven distribution of numbers in nature: the laws of Benford and Zipf
• The First Digit Problem

Cited in

(7)

• Goodness-of-Fit Testing for the Newcomb-Benford Law With Application to the Detection of Customs Fraud
• Integer percentages as electoral falsification fingerprints
• Data validity and statistical conformity with Benford's law
• A first-digit anomaly in the 2009 Iranian presidential election
• Testing firm-level data quality in China against Benford's law
• On Characterizations and Tests of Benford’s Law
• A statistical assessment of Buchanan's vote in Palm Beach county

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