Integer percentages as electoral falsification fingerprints

DOI10.1214/16-AOAS904zbMATH Open1454.62501arXiv1410.6059MaRDI QIDQ288555FDOQ288555

Authors: Dmitry Kobak, Sergey Shpilkin, Maxim S. Pshenichnikov 

Publication date: 27 May 2016

Published in: The Annals of Applied Statistics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We hypothesize that if election results are manipulated or forged, then, due to the well-known human attraction to round numbers, the frequency of reported round percentages can be increased. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed raw data from seven federal elections held in the Russian Federation during the period from 2000 to 2012 and found that in all elections since 2004 the number of polling stations reporting turnout and/or leader's result expressed by an integer percentage (as opposed to a fractional value) was much higher than expected by pure chance. Monte Carlo simulations confirmed high statistical significance of the observed phenomenon, thereby suggesting its man-made nature. Geographical analysis showed that these anomalies were concentrated in a specific subset of Russian regions which strongly suggests its orchestrated origin. Unlike previously proposed statistical indicators of alleged electoral falsifications, our observations can hardly be explained differently but by a widespread election fraud.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.6059

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zbMATH Keywords

electoral falsificationsRussian elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25)

Cites Work

• Integer percentages as electoral falsification fingerprints
• Sex, lies and self-reported counts: Bayesian mixture models for heaping in longitudinal count data via birth-death processes

Cited In (3)

• Integer percentages as electoral falsification fingerprints
• A first-digit anomaly in the 2009 Iranian presidential election
• Quick anomaly detection by the Newcomb-Benford law, with applications to electoral processes data from the USA, Puerto Rico and Venezuela

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