The structure of representative preference
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Publication:6074716
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Cites work
- A Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility"
- Aggregation operators preserving quasiconvexity
- Community Preference Fields
- Competitive division of a mixed manna
- Complete monotone quasiconcave duality
- Duality between direct and indirect utility functions under minimal hypotheses
- Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3470465 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3186512 (Why is no real title available?)
- Indifference or indecisiveness? Choice-theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences
- Lattices and ordered algebraic structures
- Minimal rationalizations
- On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of World Trade and Other Competitive Systems
- On social welfare functions and the aggregation of preferences
- On Sugeno integral as an aggregation function
- The consistency of welfare judgements with a representative consumer
Cited in
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- Variational problem associated with a model of welfare economics with a measure spaces of agents
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