Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.03.001MaRDI QIDQ608535zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philippe Choné, Laurent Linnemer

Publication date 25 November 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

case preparationsettlementsignalingtrial

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites work

• A model of efficient discovery
• Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information
• The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation
• Weakly Differentiable Functions

Cited in

(5)

• Financially-constrained lawyers: an economic theory of legal disputes
• Standards of proof and civil litigation: a game-theoretic analysis
• Investments as signals of outside options
• Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible
• Winning at Litigation through Decision Analysis

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