Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information

DOI10.2307/2297455MaRDI QIDQ3826320zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Urs Schweizer

Publication date 1989

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297455

zbMATH Keywords

economic analysis of lawefficient equilibriumgame of litigationincomplete informationjurisdictionpolitical economicssequential equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

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Cited in

(13)

• A model of efficient discovery
• Equity bargaining with common value
• Information-based trade
• The order of presentation in trials: plaintive plaintiffs
• Standards of proof and civil litigation: a game-theoretic analysis
• Signal jamming in pretrial negotiation with multiple defendants
• Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
• Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible
• A game of settlements in public contracts
• Dispute settlement with second-order uncertainty
• Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation
• Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs
• Settling with salience-biased defendants

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