False proxies for enforcement distortions in ``policing for profit research

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2023.111237MaRDI QIDQ6093778zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Murat C. Mungan

Publication date 12 September 2023

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111237

zbMATH Keywords

crimeenforcementpolicing for profitspeeding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cited in

(1)

• The Political Economy of Moral Conflict: An Empirical Study of Learning and Law Enforcement Under Prohibition

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