A reduction-based proof for authentication and session key security in three-party Kerberos
Summary: The Kerberos network security protocol provides authentication between clients and servers with the assistance of trusted servers and remains widely used. We give a reduction-based security showing that the mandatory three-party mode of Kerberos authentication and key establishment is a secure authentication protocol under standard assumptions on its encryption scheme; our results can be lifted to apply to quantum adversaries as well. As for many other real-world key exchange protocols, session key indistinguishability cannot be proven for Kerberos since the session key is used in the protocol itself, breaking indistinguishability. We can however show that Kerberos' optional sub-session mode yields secure session keys, and that the hash of the main session key is secure in Krawczyk's generalization of the authenticated and confidential channel establishment model.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1263181
- Cryptographically sound security proofs for basic and public-key Kerberos
- Provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol
- Provably secure three party encrypted key exchange scheme with explicit authentication
- Efficient and Provably Secure Generic Construction of Three-Party Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols
- Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2005
- Provably secure and efficient certificateless authenticated tripartite key agreement protocol
- Provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange from RLWE
- Multi-factor authenticated key exchange protocol in the three-party setting
This page was built for publication: A reduction-based proof for authentication and session key security in three-party Kerberos
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6096687)
