Qualitative reasoning in a two-layered framework
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Publication:6099380
DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2022.12.011arXiv2210.09095OpenAlexW4313420393MaRDI QIDQ6099380
Marta Bílková, Sabine Frittella, Ondrej Majer, Daniil Kozhemiachenko
Publication date: 20 June 2023
Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.09095
Gödel logicparaconsistent logicscomparative beliefqualitative probabilitiesbelnap-dunn logictwo-layered modal logics
Related Items
Two-layered logics for paraconsistent probabilities, Presumptive Reasoning in a Paraconsistent Setting
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