Marital preferences and stable matching in cultural evolution
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Publication:6111176
Recommendations
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Cites work
- Assortative mating, selection and mutation models for continuous variation: A reply to Felsenstein
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Cultural transmission and the evolution of gender roles
- Cultural transmission with incomplete information
- Erratum: The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem
- It's raining men! Hallelujah? The long-run consequences of male-biased sex ratios
- On the probabilistic transmission of continuous cultural traits
- The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes
- The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences
- The revealed preference theory of stable and extremal stable matchings
Cited in
(8)- Co-evolution of institutions and preferences: the case of the (human) mating market
- Labelling, homophily and preference evolution
- Cultural evolution of \textit{hinoeuma} superstition controlling human mate choice: the role of half-believer
- An evolutionary theory of monogamy
- Stable marriage and genetic algorithms: a fertile union
- Matching markets and cultural selection
- Evolution of polygamous marriage by maximization of inclusive fitness
- Cultural evolution of a belief controlling human mate choice: dynamic modeling of the \textit{hinoeuma} superstition in Japan
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