Marital preferences and stable matching in cultural evolution

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105671zbMATH Open1520.91282OpenAlexW4376254258MaRDI QIDQ6111176FDOQ6111176

Authors: Victor Hiller, Jia-Bin Wu, Hanzhe Zhang 

Publication date: 6 July 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105671

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zbMATH Keywords

cultural evolutioncultural diversitycultural integrationintergenerational transmissionGale-Shapley matchinghomophily and heterophily

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Group preferences (91B10) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Erratum: The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem
• The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences
• Assortative mating, selection and mutation models for continuous variation: A reply to Felsenstein
• The revealed preference theory of stable and extremal stable matchings
• On the probabilistic transmission of continuous cultural traits
• Cultural transmission and the evolution of gender roles
• Cultural transmission with incomplete information
• It's raining men! Hallelujah? The long-run consequences of male-biased sex ratios

Cited In (8)

• Co-evolution of institutions and preferences: the case of the (human) mating market
• Labelling, homophily and preference evolution
• Cultural evolution of \textit{hinoeuma} superstition controlling human mate choice: the role of half-believer
• An evolutionary theory of monogamy
• Stable marriage and genetic algorithms: a fertile union
• Matching markets and cultural selection
• Cultural evolution of a belief controlling human mate choice: dynamic modeling of the \textit{hinoeuma} superstition in Japan
• Evolution of polygamous marriage by maximization of inclusive fitness

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