Information, market power and welfare
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Publication:6139975
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105756OpenAlexW4387911068MaRDI QIDQ6139975FDOQ6139975
Author name not available (Why is that?)
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105756
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Financial markets (91G15)
Cites Work
- On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
- Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology
- Price inference in small markets
- Strategic supply function competition with private information
- Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
- Strategic Trading and Welfare in a Dynamic Market
- Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare
- What is the Optimal Trading Frequency in Financial Markets?
- Information and strategic behavior
- Smooth Trading with Overconfidence and Market Power
- Trading and Information Diffusion in Over-the-Counter Markets
- Information acquisition with heterogeneous valuations
- Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals
- Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
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