Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions

DOI10.3982/TE3675MaRDI QIDQ5164524zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carolina Manzano, Xavier Vives

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3675

zbMATH Keywords

private informationtreasury auctionselectricity auctionsmarket integrationdemand/supply schedule competitionliquidity auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Welfare economics (91B15)

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Cited in

(5)

• Information, market power and welfare
• Information linkages in a financial market with imperfect competition
• Competition in schedules with cursed traders
• Information spillover in markets with heterogeneous traders
• On the functional equivalence of two perfectly competitive economies with negative exponential utility and linear utility with a quadratic holding cost

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