Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions

DOI10.3982/TE3675zbMath1475.91116OpenAlexW3124899849MaRDI QIDQ5164524

Carolina Manzano, Xavier Vives

Publication date: 11 November 2021

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3675

zbMATH Keywords

private informationtreasury auctionselectricity auctionsmarket integrationdemand/supply schedule competitionliquidity auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Welfare economics (91B15)

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