Submixing and shift-invariant stochastic games

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Publication:6183353

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00860-5zbMATH Open1530.91048arXiv1401.6575OpenAlexW3157164353MaRDI QIDQ6183353FDOQ6183353


Authors: Hugo Gimbert, Edon Kelmendi Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 4 January 2024

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the payoff function is both shift-invariant and submixing, then the game is half-positional, i.e. the first player has an optimal strategy which is both deterministic and stationary. This result relies on the existence of epsilon-subgame-perfect strategies in shift-invariant games, a second contribution of the paper. The techniques can be used to establish a third result: for shift-invariant and submixing payoff functions, the existence of finite-memory strategies for player 2 in one-player games implies the same property for two-player games as well.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.6575




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