An information-theoretic approach to partially identified auction models
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Publication:6193037
DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2023.105566OpenAlexW4388550000MaRDI QIDQ6193037
Publication date: 13 February 2024
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2023.105566
Statistics (62-XX) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)
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- Foundations of Info-Metrics
- Inference for Parameters Defined by Moment Inequalities Using Generalized Moment Selection
- Robustness
- Estimation and Confidence Regions for Parameter Sets in Econometric Models
- Identification of Standard Auction Models
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