Analysis of reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes
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Publication:6199262
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-25922-8_7arXiv1904.12215OpenAlexW2965452800MaRDI QIDQ6199262FDOQ6199262
Authors: P. M. Santini, Massimo Battaglioni, Franco Chiaraluce, Marco Baldi 
Publication date: 23 February 2024
Published in: Code-Based Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: In this paper we study reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes, which encompass low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes and moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes. We show that the feasibility of these attacks is not strictly associated to the quasi-cyclic (QC) structure of the code but is related to the intrinsically probabilistic decoding of any sparse parity-check code. So, these attacks not only work against QC codes, but can be generalized to broader classes of codes. We provide a novel algorithm that, in the case of a QC code, allows recovering a larger amount of information than that retrievable through existing attacks and we use this algorithm to characterize new side-channel information leakages. We devise a theoretical model for the decoder that describes and justifies our results. Numerical simulations are provided that confirm the effectiveness of our approach.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.12215
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