On the security of Y-00 under fast correlation and other attacks on the key

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Publication:620794

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSLETA.2006.12.033zbMATH Open1203.81053arXivquant-ph/0608028OpenAlexW2080355820WikidataQ62039360 ScholiaQ62039360MaRDI QIDQ620794FDOQ620794


Authors: Horace P. Yuen, Ranjith Nair Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 20 January 2011

Published in: Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The potential weakness of the Y-00 direct encryption protocol when the encryption box ENC in Y-00 is not chosen properly is demonstrated in a fast correlation attack by S. Donnet et al in Phys. Lett. A 35, 6 (2006) 406-410. In this paper, we show how this weakness can be eliminated with a proper design of ENC. In particular, we present a Y-00 configuration that is more secure than AES under known-plaintext attack. It is also shown that under any ciphertext-only attack, full information-theoretic security on the Y-00 seed key is obtained for any ENC when proper deliberate signal randomization is employed.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0608028




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