Exposed-key weakness of
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Abstract: The protocol given by Barbosa emph{et al.}, PRL 90, 227901 (2003) claims to be a secure way of encrypting messages using mesoscopic coherent states. We show that transmission under exposes information about the secret key to an eavesdropper, and we estimate the rate at which an eavesdropper can learn about the key. We also consider the consequences of using further randomization to protect the key and how our analysis applies to this case. We conclude that is not informationally secure.
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(3)- Comment on: ``Exposed-key weakness of \(\alpha \eta \) [Phys. Lett. A 370 (2007) 131]
- Reply to: ``Comment on: `Exposed-key weakness of \(\alpha \eta \)' [Phys. Lett. A 370 (2007) 131] [Phys. Lett. A 372 (2008) 7091]
- On the security of \(\alpha \eta\): response to \` some attacks on quantum-based cryptographic protocols'
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