A bipolar model of assertability and belief
DOI10.1016/J.IJAR.2010.05.005zbMATH Open1213.68623OpenAlexW2045900585MaRDI QIDQ622286FDOQ622286
Authors: Jonathan Lawry, Inés González-Rodríguez
Publication date: 31 January 2011
Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2010.05.005
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Cited In (8)
- Probability, fuzziness and borderline cases
- On truth-gaps, bipolar belief and the assertability of vague propositions
- Borderlines and probabilities of borderlines: on the interconnection between vagueness and uncertainty
- A bipolar model of vague concepts based on random set and prototype theory
- Relating De Morgan triples with Atanassov's intuitionistic De Morgan triples via automorphisms
- Borderline vs. unknown: comparing three-valued representations of imperfect information
- On truth-gaps, truth-gluts, and bipolar propositions
- Generalized representation theorem and its application to the construction of fuzzy sets: existence and uniqueness
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