Temporised equilibria: a rational concept of fairness into game theory

DOI10.1504/IJCSM.2010.037444MaRDI QIDQ622832zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Riccardo Alberti

Publication date 4 February 2011

Published in International Journal of Computing Science and Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1504/IJCSM.2010.037444

zbMATH Keywords

deterrentfairnessgame theoryjudgeK-gamemathematicsmobile ad-hoc networksmobile networksNash equilibrianon-zero-sum gamesprisoner's dilemmascalar parametric functionsymmetric gamestemporised equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Review text

Summary: This paper introduces a paradigm for the resolution of a particular class of games (K) within game theory and develops mathematical methods for the analysis of conflicting situations in which the contenders share a finite series of measurable information. Classical equilibria schemes do not contemplate the presence of a symmetric and incomplete perturbative element in the games, leaving out a study case of enormous interest. The main result is the demonstration of the existence of the temporised equilibrium for every K-game and, in particular, the solution properties in symmetric games, with references to the geometrical structure of the proposed argumentation.

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