Infinitesimal characterization of a feedback Nash equilibrium in a differential game

DOI10.1134/S0081543810070035zbMATHOpenAlexMaRDI QIDQ643789FDO

Authors Yuriĭ V. Averbukh

Publication date 2 November 2011

Published in Proceedings of the Steklov Institute of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1134/s0081543810070035

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamefeedback Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) 2-person games (91A05)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7640642

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3862969 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 733957 (Why is no real title available?)
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory

Cited in

(7)

• Infinitesimal characterization of Nash equilibrium for differential games with many players
• Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium
• Universal Nash equilibrium strategies for differential games
• Characterization of feedback Nash equilibrium for differential games
• On the Instability of the Feedback Equilibrium Payoff in a Nonzero-Sum Differential Game on the Line
• A qualitative characterization of symmetric open-loop Nash equilibria in discounted infinite horizon differential games
• A dynamic Cournot-Nash game: a representation of a finitely repeated feedback game

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