Maximize egalitarian welfare for cake cutting

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-39344-0_20MaRDI QIDQ6535822FDOQ6535822

Authors: Xiaolin Bu 

Publication date: 28 February 2024

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zbMATH Keywords

fair divisioncake-cuttingegalitarian welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Degeneracy in interior point methods for linear programming: A survey
• The price of fairness
• How to Cut A Cake Fairly
• Sur la division pragmatique
• An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol
• The efficiency of fair division
• Equitable, Envy-Free, and Efficient Cake Cutting for Two People and Its Application to Divisible Goods
• Two-person cake cutting: the optimal number of cuts
• Better ways to cut a cake
• An approximation algorithm for max-min fair allocation of indivisible goods
• A note on cake cutting
• A discrete and bounded envy-free cake cutting protocol for four agents

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