Maximize egalitarian welfare for cake cutting

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-39344-0_20MaRDI QIDQ6535822zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Xiaolin Bu

Publication date 28 February 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39344-0_20

zbMATH Keywords

cake-cuttingegalitarian welfarefair division

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A discrete and bounded envy-free cake cutting protocol for four agents
• A note on cake cutting
• An approximation algorithm for max-min fair allocation of indivisible goods
• An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol
• Better ways to cut a cake
• Degeneracy in interior point methods for linear programming: A survey
• Equitable, Envy-Free, and Efficient Cake Cutting for Two People and Its Application to Divisible Goods
• How to Cut A Cake Fairly
• Sur la division pragmatique
• The efficiency of fair division
• The price of fairness
• Two-person cake cutting: the optimal number of cuts

Cited in

(2)

• The incentive guarantees behind Nash welfare in divisible resources allocation
• Fairer than fair: sharp bounds for connected super-proportional cake cutting

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