Platform design when sellers use pricing algorithms

DOI10.3982/ECTA19978MaRDI QIDQ6536592zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Justin P. Johnson, Andrew Rhodes

Publication date 13 May 2024

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmscollusionQ-learningprominenceplatform design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2131739 (Why is no real title available?)
• Asynchronous stochastic approximation and Q-learning
• Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
• Buyer groups as strategic commitments
• On the Convergence of Stochastic Iterative Dynamic Programming Algorithms
• Platform design when sellers use pricing algorithms
• Q-learning agents in a Cournot oligopoly model
• Reinforcement learning. An introduction
• The evolution of cooperation
• \({\mathcal Q}\)-learning

Cited in

(4)

• Competitor referral by platforms
• Traffic channeling under uncertain conversion rates on e‐commerce platforms
• The effect of demand variability on the adoption and design of a third party's pricing algorithm
• Platform design when sellers use pricing algorithms

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