Platform design when sellers use pricing algorithms

DOI10.3982/ECTA19978zbMATH Open1541.91096MaRDI QIDQ6536592FDOQ6536592

Authors: Justin P. Johnson, Andrew Rhodes 

Publication date: 13 May 2024

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

algorithmscollusionQ-learningprominenceplatform design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

• \({\mathcal Q}\)-learning
• The evolution of cooperation
• Reinforcement learning. An introduction
• Asynchronous stochastic approximation and Q-learning
• Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
• On the Convergence of Stochastic Iterative Dynamic Programming Algorithms
• Buyer groups as strategic commitments
• Q-learning agents in a Cournot oligopoly model
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Platform design when sellers use pricing algorithms

Cited In (4)

• Competitor referral by platforms
• Traffic channeling under uncertain conversion rates on e‐commerce platforms
• The effect of demand variability on the adoption and design of a third party's pricing algorithm
• Platform design when sellers use pricing algorithms

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