Optimal commissions and subscriptions in mutual aid platforms
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Publication:6569743
DOI10.1017/ASB.2023.21zbMATH Open1545.91277MaRDI QIDQ6569743FDOQ6569743
Authors: Yixing Zhao, Yan Zeng 
Publication date: 9 July 2024
Published in: ASTIN Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
- Actuarial fairness and solidarity in pooled annuity funds
- Spatial pricing in ride-sharing networks
- Equilibria in health exchanges: adverse selection versus reclassification risk
- From risk sharing to pure premium for a large number of heterogeneous losses
- Peer-to-peer multi-risk insurance and mutual aid
- Investing in your own and peers' risks: the simple analytics of P2P insurance
- Size-biased transform and conditional mean risk sharing, with application to p2p insurance and tontines
- Stop-loss protection for a large P2P insurance pool
- Optimal design for network mutual aid
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