Optimal commissions and subscriptions in mutual aid platforms
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Publication:6569743
DOI10.1017/ASB.2023.21zbMATH Open1545.91277MaRDI QIDQ6569743FDOQ6569743
Publication date: 9 July 2024
Published in: ASTIN Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
- ACTUARIAL FAIRNESS AND SOLIDARITY IN POOLED ANNUITY FUNDS
- Spatial Pricing in Ride-Sharing Networks
- Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection versus Reclassification Risk
- From risk sharing to pure premium for a large number of heterogeneous losses
- Peer-to-peer multi-risk insurance and mutual aid
- Investing in your own and peers' risks: the simple analytics of P2P insurance
- SIZE-BIASED TRANSFORM AND CONDITIONAL MEAN RISK SHARING, WITH APPLICATION TO P2P INSURANCE AND TONTINES
- Stop-loss protection for a large P2P insurance pool
- Optimal design for network mutual aid
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