Optimal commissions and subscriptions in mutual aid platforms

DOI10.1017/ASB.2023.21MaRDI QIDQ6569743zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yixing Zhao, Yan Zeng

Publication date 9 July 2024

Published in ASTIN Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationrisk managementadverse selectionrevenue managementmutual aid platform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

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Cites work

• Actuarial fairness and solidarity in pooled annuity funds
• Equilibria in health exchanges: adverse selection versus reclassification risk
• From risk sharing to pure premium for a large number of heterogeneous losses
• General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
• Investing in your own and peers' risks: the simple analytics of P2P insurance
• Optimal design for network mutual aid
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Peer-to-peer multi-risk insurance and mutual aid
• Size-biased transform and conditional mean risk sharing, with application to p2p insurance and tontines
• Spatial pricing in ride-sharing networks
• Stop-loss protection for a large P2P insurance pool

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