Optimal commissions and subscriptions in mutual aid platforms
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Publication:6569743
Recommendations
- Optimal design for network mutual aid
- Peer-to-peer multi-risk insurance and mutual aid
- Optimal risk management for the sharing economy with stranger danger and service quality
- Mutual aid insurance with a three-state Markov chain
- Platform competition in peer-to-peer lending considering risk control ability
Cites work
- Actuarial fairness and solidarity in pooled annuity funds
- Equilibria in health exchanges: adverse selection versus reclassification risk
- From risk sharing to pure premium for a large number of heterogeneous losses
- General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
- Investing in your own and peers' risks: the simple analytics of P2P insurance
- Optimal design for network mutual aid
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- Peer-to-peer multi-risk insurance and mutual aid
- Size-biased transform and conditional mean risk sharing, with application to p2p insurance and tontines
- Spatial pricing in ride-sharing networks
- Stop-loss protection for a large P2P insurance pool
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