On the impossibility of surviving (iterated) deletion of weakly dominated strategies in rational MPC

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-48615-9_14MaRDI QIDQ6581796zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Johannes Blömer, Jan Bobolz, Henrik Bröcher

Publication date 1 August 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48615-9_14

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryiterated deletion of weakly dominated strategiesmultiparty computationrational cryptographyrational secret sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

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Cites work

• A complete characterization of game-theoretically fair, multi-party coin toss
• Bridging Game Theory and Cryptography: Recent Results and Future Directions
• Cryptography and game theory
• Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information
• Distributed computing meets game theory
• Dominance rationality: a unified approach
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Efficient rational secret sharing in standard communication networks
• Fair computation with rational players
• Game theoretic notions of fairness in multi-party coin toss
• Game theory meets network security and privacy
• Game-theoretic fairness meets multi-party protocols: the case of leader election
• How to share a secret
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485554 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1759774 (Why is no real title available?)
• Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility
• Limits on the power of cryptographic cheap talk
• Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation
• Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited
• Rationality and Adversarial Behavior in Multi-party Computation
• Secret-Sharing Schemes: A Survey
• Towards a game theoretic view of secure computation
• Utility dependence in correct and fair rational secret sharing

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