Vertical contracting between a vertically integrated firm and a downstream rival

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01529-6MaRDI QIDQ6590147zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Frago Kourandi, Ioannis N. Pinopoulos

Publication date 21 August 2024

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingtwo-part tariffsvertical contractinglinear tariffsvertically integrated firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Recommendations

• Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure
• Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare
• Alternative forms of buyer power in a vertical duopoly: implications for profits, welfare, and cost pass-through
• Optimal tariffs with uncertainty and downstream fixed costs
• On the welfare effects of vertical integration: opportunism vs. double marginalization

Cites work

• Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information
• Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities
• Friction in related-party trade when a rival is also a customer
• Greater search cost reduces prices
• Insurer competition in health care markets
• On the microeconomic foundations of linear demand for differentiated products
• On the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownership
• On the welfare effects of vertical integration: opportunism vs. double marginalization
• Revealed preference tests for price competition in multi-product differentiated markets
• Should a retailer bargain over a wholesale price with a manufacturer using a dual-channel supply chain?
• The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices
• The welfare effects of vertical integration in multichannel television markets
• Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data
• Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition
• Vertical integration and knowledge disclosure

Cited in

(1)

• Alternative forms of buyer power in a vertical duopoly: implications for profits, welfare, and cost pass-through

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