Optimal influence design in networks

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105877zbMATH Open1544.91241MaRDI QIDQ6604765FDOQ6604765

Authors Daeyoung Jeong, Euncheol Shin 

Publication date 13 September 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

singular value decompositionsocial networkssocial learningDavis-Kahan \(\sin\Theta\) theoremWedin \(\sin\Theta\) theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Social learning (91D15)

Recommendations

• Optimal influence under observational learning
• Influencing opinion networks: optimization and games
• Strategic influence in social networks
• Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities
• Persuasion in networks: public signals and cores

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47363 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1239310 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3799843 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6438182 (Why is no real title available?)
• A theory of non-Bayesian social learning
• A useful variant of the Davis-Kahan theorem for statisticians
• Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment
• Bayesian learning in social networks.
• Distributions of centrality on networks
• Dynamic pricing of network goods with boundedly rational consumers
• Graphon games: a statistical framework for network games and interventions
• Homophily and long-run integration in social networks
• How homophily affects the speed of learning and best-response dynamics
• Learning from Neighbours
• Linear algebra and learning from data
• Modern Geometry.
• Monopoly pricing and diffusion of social network goods
• Network structure and naive sequential learning
• On the spectra of general random graphs
• Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions
• Perturbation bounds in connection with singular value decomposition
• Pricing network effects
• Reaching a Consensus
• Social and economic networks.
• Social network formation and strategic interaction in large networks
• Statistical foundations of data science
• Targeting Interventions in Networks
• Testing Models of Social Learning on Networks: Evidence From Two Experiments
• The Lasso problem and uniqueness
• The Rotation of Eigenvectors by a Perturbation. III
• The Spectra of Random Graphs with Given Expected Degrees

Cited in

(2)

• Optimal influence under observational learning
• Targeting in social networks with anonymized information

This page was built for publication: Optimal influence design in networks

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6604765)