Non-factorizable joint probabilities and evolutionarily stable strategies in the quantum prisoner's dilemma game

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Publication:662986

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSLETA.2009.05.020zbMATH Open1231.81017arXiv0902.2889OpenAlexW2101140213WikidataQ62044599 ScholiaQ62044599MaRDI QIDQ662986FDOQ662986

Azhar Iqbal, Derek Abbott

Publication date: 13 February 2012

Published in: Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The well known refinement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is investigated in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game that is played using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setting. Earlier results report that in this scheme the classical NE remains intact as the unique solution of the quantum PD game. In contrast, we show here that interestingly in this scheme a non-classical solution for the ESS emerges for the quantum PD.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.2889




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