Social insurance and taxation under sequential majority voting and utilitarian regimes

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)00840-EMaRDI QIDQ672686zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors S. Rao Aiyagari, Dan Peled

Publication date 28 February 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)00840-e

zbMATH Keywords

capital accumulationProportional taxesSequential majority votingUtilitarian government

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation
• The political economy of endogenous taxation and redistribution
• Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
• On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location
• Voting over income taxation

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4051296 (Why is no real title available?)
• Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis
• The Optimal Linear Income-tax

Cited in

(4)

• Social insurance with representative democracy
• Uncertainty and the size of government
• On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location
• Voting in a stochastic environment: the case of two groups

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