Social insurance and taxation under sequential majority voting and utilitarian regimes

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)00840-EzbMATH Open0900.90252OpenAlexW1990357668MaRDI QIDQ672686FDOQ672686

Authors: S. Rao Aiyagari, Dan Peled 

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)00840-e

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zbMATH Keywords

capital accumulationProportional taxesSequential majority votingUtilitarian government

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Optimal Linear Income-tax

Cited In (4)

• On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location
• Voting in a stochastic environment: the case of two groups
• Social insurance with representative democracy
• Uncertainty and the size of government

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