Modeling evolutionary games in populations with demographic structure

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.05.036zbMath1343.91006OpenAlexW1814497493WikidataQ50902161 ScholiaQ50902161MaRDI QIDQ739255

Annette Baudisch, Stefano Giaimo, Xiang-Yi Li, Arne Traulsen

Publication date: 18 August 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.05.036

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsevolutionary game theorylife historyageing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical geography and demography (91D20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Life-history traits and the replicator equation ⋮ Frequency-dependent growth in class-structured populations: continuous dynamics in the limit of weak selection ⋮ Age structure, replicator equation, and the prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Towards a replicator dynamics model of age structured populations

Uses Software

• Dynamo

Cites Work

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• Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Density games
• Trust and trustworthiness across different age groups
• Evolutionarily stable strategies depending on population density
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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