On when a semantics is not a semantics: some reasons for disliking the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevance logic
DOI10.1007/BF00258440zbMATH Open0416.03022OpenAlexW2168302543MaRDI QIDQ754182FDOQ754182
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00258440
negationrelevance logicentailmentRoutley-Meyer semanticsrelevant implicationphilosophicalAnderson-Belnap systemsparadoxes of strict implication
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45)
Cited In (19)
- Relation algebras of Sugihara, Belnap, Meyer, and Church
- A relevant logic of questions
- Logical predictivism
- Two, Three, Four, Infinity: The Path to the Four-Valued Logic and Beyond
- Arrows Pointing at Arrows: Arrow Logic, Relevance Logic, and Relation Algebras
- RELEVANCE LOGIC AND THE CALCULUS OF RELATIONS
- Bridging the Two Plans in the Semantics for Relevant Logic
- Strong paraconsistency and the basic constructive logic for an even weaker sense of consistency
- Disjunction and negation in information based semantics
- The Relevance of Relevance to Relevance Logic
- What is computation?
- Informational semantics as a third alternative?
- A reinterpretation of the semilattice semantics with applications
- Relevant logic and the theory of information
- Subminimal negation on the Australian plan
- What is a relevant connective?
- Understanding negation implicationally in the relevant logic R
- Prior, translational semantics, and the Barcan formula
- Paraconsistent logics?
This page was built for publication: On when a semantics is not a semantics: some reasons for disliking the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevance logic
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q754182)