On when a semantics is not a semantics: some reasons for disliking the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevance logic

DOI10.1007/BF00258440MaRDI QIDQ754182zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors B. Jack Copeland

Publication date 1979

Published in Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00258440

zbMATH Keywords

negationrelevance logicentailmentRoutley-Meyer semanticsrelevant implicationphilosophicalAnderson-Belnap systemsparadoxes of strict implication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45)

Cited in

(19)

• Relation algebras of Sugihara, Belnap, Meyer, and Church
• Bridging the two plans in the semantics for relevant logic
• A relevant logic of questions
• Logical predictivism
• The relevance of relevance to relevance logic
• RELEVANCE LOGIC AND THE CALCULUS OF RELATIONS
• Strong paraconsistency and the basic constructive logic for an even weaker sense of consistency
• Disjunction and negation in information based semantics
• Arrows pointing at arrows: arrow logic, relevance logic, and relation algebras
• What is computation?
• Informational semantics as a third alternative?
• A reinterpretation of the semilattice semantics with applications
• Relevant logic and the theory of information
• Subminimal negation on the Australian plan
• What is a relevant connective?
• Understanding negation implicationally in the relevant logic R
• Prior, translational semantics, and the Barcan formula
• Two, three, four, infinity: the path to the four-valued logic and beyond
• Paraconsistent logics?

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