On when a semantics is not a semantics: some reasons for disliking the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevance logic
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Publication:754182
DOI10.1007/BF00258440zbMath0416.03022MaRDI QIDQ754182
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
negation; entailment; relevance logic; Routley-Meyer semantics; relevant implication; philosophical; Anderson-Belnap systems; paradoxes of strict implication
03B45: Modal logic (including the logic of norms)
03A05: Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
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