If animals know their own fighting ability, the evolutionarily stable level of fighting is reduced

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2004.07.024zbMATH Open1442.92206OpenAlexW1998782554WikidataQ51985930 ScholiaQ51985930MaRDI QIDQ776430FDOQ776430

Authors: J. M. McNamara, Alasdair I. Houston 

Publication date: 9 July 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.07.024

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zbMATH Keywords

thresholdevolutionary stable strategyhawk-dove gamefighting ability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Animal behavior (92D50) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The logic of animal conflict
• Assessing predation risk: optimal behaviour and rules of thumb

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• The mask game with multiple populations
• Can transitive inference evolve in animals playing the hawk-dove game?
• Social eavesdropping: a game-theoretic analysis
• The dynamics of fitness and wealth distributions -- a stochastic game-theoretic model
• The coevolution of transitive inference and memory capacity in the hawk-dove game

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