Breaking the Bluetooth pairing -- the fixed coordinate invalid curve attack
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Publication:778923
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-38471-5_11zbMATH Open1453.94060OpenAlexW2928007274MaRDI QIDQ778923FDOQ778923
Authors: Eli Biham, Lior Neumann 
Publication date: 21 July 2020
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38471-5_11
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