Learning rational expectations in a policy game

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(91)90015-SzbMATH Open0728.90026OpenAlexW2017209816MaRDI QIDQ805487FDOQ805487

Authors: Martin W. Cripps 

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(91)90015-s

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zbMATH Keywords

learning rational expectations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Utility theory (91B16) Economic growth models (91B62) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification
• Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation
• Changes in regime and the term structure. A note

Cited In (6)

• Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
• Learning non-rational expectations equilibria
• Simplicity versus optimality: The choice of monetary policy rules when agents must learn
• Learnability and transparency with time inconsistent monetary policy
• Boundedly rational rule learning in a guessing game
• Are policy variables exogenous? The econometric implications of learning while maximizing

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