Learning rational expectations in a policy game
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3727971 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52648 (Why is no real title available?)
- Changes in regime and the term structure. A note
- Credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification
- Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
Cited in
(6)- Simplicity versus optimality: The choice of monetary policy rules when agents must learn
- Are policy variables exogenous? The econometric implications of learning while maximizing
- Learning non-rational expectations equilibria
- Boundedly rational rule learning in a guessing game
- Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
- Learnability and transparency with time inconsistent monetary policy
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