Asymmetric information on price can affect Bertrand duopoly players with the gradient-based mechanism
Summary: We study a Bertrand duopoly game in which firms adopt a gradient-based mechanism to update their prices. In this competition, one of the firms knows somehow the price adopted by the other firm next time step. Such asymmetric information of the market price possessed by one firm gives interesting results about its stability in the market. Under such information, we use the bounded rationality mechanism to build the model describing the game at hand. We calculate the equilibrium points of the game and study their stabilities. Using different sets of parameter values, we show that the interior equilibrium point can be destabilized through flip and Neimark-Sacker bifurcations. We compare the region of stability of the proposed model with a classical Bertrand model without asymmetric information. The results show that the proposed game's map is noninvertible with type \(Z_0- Z_2\) or \(Z_1- Z_3\), while the classical model is of type \(Z_0- Z_2\) only. This explains the quite complicated basins of attraction given for the proposed map.
- Stability of equilibrium prices in a dynamic duopoly Bertrand game with asymmetric information and cluster spillovers
- On complex dynamics of Cournot-Bertrand game with asymmetric market information
- Effect of information asymmetry in Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality
- The influence of information on the stability of a dynamic Bertrand game
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2173977
- A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly
- Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
- Chaotic congestion games
- Complex dynamics analysis for a duopoly Stackelberg game model with bounded rationality
- Complexity study on the Cournot-Bertrand mixed duopoly game model with market share preference
- Cooperation versus noncooperation: Cournot duopolistic game based on delay and time-dependent parameters
- Dynamic Bertrand oligopoly
- Dynamic investigations in a duopoly game with price competition based on relative profit and profit maximization
- Fixed fee discounts and Bertrand competition in vertically related markets
- Nonlinear Cournot and Bertrand-type dynamic triopoly with differentiated products and heterogeneous expectations
- Nonlinear dynamics and global analysis of a heterogeneous Cournot duopoly with a local monopolistic approach versus a gradient rule with endogenous reactivity
- On Cournot-Bertrand competition with differentiated products
- On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
- On the dynamic analysis of Cournot-Bertrand equilibria
- Quantity and price competition in a differentiated triopoly: static and dynamic investigations
- Study and simulation on discrete dynamics of Bertrand triopoly team-game
- Study on a 3-dimensional game model with delayed bounded rationality
- The dynamics of a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products: Synchronization, intermittency and global dynamics
- The dynamics of a quantum Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products and heterogeneous expectations
- The dynamics of Bertrand model with bounded rationality
- Tripoly Stackelberg game model: one leader versus two followers
- Dynamic investigations in a Stackelberg model with differentiated products and bounded rationality
- The influence of information on the stability of a dynamic Bertrand game
- Effect of information asymmetry in Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality
- Stability of equilibrium prices in a dynamic duopoly Bertrand game with asymmetric information and cluster spillovers
- Price-setting dynamical duopoly with incomplete information
This page was built for publication: Asymmetric information on price can affect Bertrand duopoly players with the gradient-based mechanism
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q826385)
