Pricing and capacity allocation under asymmetric information using Paris metro pricing

DOI10.1504/IJOR.2009.025196MaRDI QIDQ840593zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antonios Printezis, Gopalakrishnan Mohan, A. N. Burnetas

Publication date 13 September 2009

Published in International Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1504/ijor.2009.025196

zbMATH Keywords

queueingcapacity allocationcapacity managementParis metro pricing (PMP)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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