Pricing and capacity allocation under asymmetric information using Paris metro pricing

DOI10.1504/IJOR.2009.025196zbMATH Open1169.91306OpenAlexW2001880690MaRDI QIDQ840593FDOQ840593

Authors: Antonios Printezis, Gopalakrishnan Mohan, A. N. Burnetas 

Publication date: 13 September 2009

Published in: International Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1504/ijor.2009.025196

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zbMATH Keywords

queueingcapacity allocationcapacity managementParis metro pricing (PMP)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited In (3)

• Fair ticket pricing in public transport as a constrained cost allocation game
• A short state of the art on multi-leader-follower games
• A mathematical model of the Paris Metro Pricing scheme for charging packet networks

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