Production in incomplete markets: expectations matter for political stability
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Publication:845599
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.09.005zbMATH Open1179.91130MaRDI QIDQ845599FDOQ845599
Authors: Hervé Crès, Mich Tvede 
Publication date: 29 January 2010
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/10267
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Cites Work
- Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
- Real effects of money in general equilibrium
- Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
- The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
- Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets
- Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
- A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies
- A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: Multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems
- Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting
Cited In (2)
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