Market games in large economies with a finite number of types

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0094-6zbMATH Open1172.91303OpenAlexW2141498571MaRDI QIDQ873902FDOQ873902

Ehud Lehrer, Yaron Azrieli

Publication date: 20 March 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0094-6

zbMATH Keywords

CoreCooperative fuzzy gamesInvestment gamesMarket games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

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• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stability and Shapley value for an \(n\)-persons fuzzy game
• Mathematical methods of game and economic theory
• Cooperative Fuzzy Games
• Supportable cost functions for the multiproduct firm
• Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes.
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (9)

• Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: two sides of one coin
• A new integral for capacities
• Market representations of $n$-person games
• Updating toward the signal
• On some families of cooperative fuzzy games
• Market Games and Clubs
• Fuzzy cores and fuzzy balancedness
• Large market games with demand uncertainty.
• A note on characterizing core stability with fuzzy games

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