A preference model for choice subject to surprise

DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9472-xzbMath1378.91072OpenAlexW2054230462WikidataQ59433521 ScholiaQ59433521MaRDI QIDQ892975

Simon Grant, John Quiggin

Publication date: 13 November 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9472-x

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityexpected uncertain utilityunforeseen consequences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (10)

Pessimism and optimism towards new discoveries ⋮ Introspective unawareness and observable choice ⋮ Cognitive limits and preferences for information ⋮ Subjective States Without the Completeness Axiom ⋮ An intertemporal model of growing awareness ⋮ Awareness of unawareness: a theory of decision making in the face of ignorance ⋮ A behavioral definition of unforeseen contingencies ⋮ Unawareness without AU introspection ⋮ Ambiguity under growing awareness ⋮ Ambiguity and awareness: a coherent multiple priors model

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• Linear utility theory for belief functions
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• Unawareness with ``possible possible worlds
• Inductive reasoning about unawareness
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• Expected Uncertain Utility Theory
• Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine

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