Leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information and applications

From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:901174)




Abstract: This paper is concerned with a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-sigma-algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of game problem has wide applications in finance, economics and management engineering such as newsvendor problems, cooperative advertising and pricing problems. Stochastic maximum principles and verification theorems with partial information are obtained, to represent the Stackelberg equilibrium. As applications, a linear-quadratic leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information is studied. It is shown that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium admits a state feedback representation if some system of Riccati equations is solvable.



Cites work


Cited in
(57)






This page was built for publication: Leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information and applications

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q901174)