New proofs for NMAC and HMAC: security without collision resistance
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Publication:901373
DOI10.1007/s00145-014-9185-xzbMath1332.94056OpenAlexW2043711803MaRDI QIDQ901373
Publication date: 11 January 2016
Published in: Journal of Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-014-9185-x
Related Items (12)
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