Double auction dynamics: structural effects of non-binding price controls

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2003.06.001MaRDI QIDQ953675zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dhananjay (Dan) K. Gode, Shyam Sunder

Publication date 6 November 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/27484

zbMATH Keywords

allocative efficiencyprice controlsdouble auction dynamicszero-intelligence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

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Cites work

• Evolution and market competition
• Expectationally driven market volatility: An experimental study
• Nonclassical demand a model-free examination of price-quantity relations in the Marseille fish market
• Price Formation in Single Call Markets
• Price formation in double auction markets
• Tracking the invisible hand: convergence of double auctions to competive equilibrium

Cited in

(4)

• Auction design for the allocation of carbon emission allowances to supply chains via multi-agent-based model and Q-learning
• Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium
• Price floors and competition
• Dynamic price formation in a futures market via double auctions

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