Quantitative games with interval objectives

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.FSTTCS.2014.365MaRDI QIDQ2978528zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul Hunter, Jean-François Raskin

Publication date 25 April 2017

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1404.4856

zbMATH Keywords

discount sum gamesmean-payoff gamesquantitative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35)

Abstract: Traditionally quantitative games such as mean-payoff games and discount sum games have two players -- one trying to maximize the payoff, the other trying to minimize it. The associated decision problem, "Can Eve (the maximizer) achieve, for example, a positive payoff?" can be thought of as one player trying to attain a payoff in the interval $(0,infty)$. In this paper we consider the more general problem of determining if a player can attain a payoff in a finite union of arbitrary intervals for various payoff functions (liminf, mean-payoff, discount sum, total sum). In particular this includes the interesting exact-value problem, "Can Eve achieve a payoff of exactly (e.g.) 0?"

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Cited in

(3)

• On memoryless quantitative objectives
• The cost of exactness in quantitative reachability
• Deterministic weighted automata under partial observability

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