Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems

DOI10.1007/S003550050052MaRDI QIDQ2365084zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Richard McLean, Simon Wilkie, John P. Conley

Publication date 4 February 1997

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050052

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic foundationscardinal utility functionsimpossibility resultreference functionsocial choice rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

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