Reliability of information aggregation with regional biases: A note

DOI10.1007/S11238-007-9078-7MaRDI QIDQ1025656zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martina Behm, Hans Peter Grüner

Publication date 19 June 2009

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9078-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
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• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

Cited in

(2)

• A general stability analysis on regional and national voting schemes against noise -- why is an electoral college more stable than a direct popular election?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3982272 (Why is no real title available?)

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