Reputation and sovereign default

DOI10.3982/ECTA16685MaRDI QIDQ5020515zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Manuel Amador, Christopher Phelan

Publication date 6 January 2022

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16685

zbMATH Keywords

debt defaultgovernment reputationsovereign debt

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45)

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Cited in

(14)

• A model of sovereign debt with private information
• Sovereign default: the role of expectations
• A contraction for sovereign debt models
• Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation
• Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt
• Nominal sovereign debt
• Sovereign debt and incentives to default with uninsurable risks
• Sovereign bonds since Waterloo
• Take the short route: equilibrium default and debt maturity
• The credibility of a threat to nationalize
• A quantitative theory of the credit score
• On the sovereign debt paradox
• Sovereign rating after private and official restructuring
• Crony capitalism and sovereign default

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