Robust scoring rules

DOI10.3982/TE3557MaRDI QIDQ4991713zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elias Tsakas

Publication date 3 June 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3557

zbMATH Keywords

noninvasive belief elicitationpopulation beliefsposterior-separabilityprior beliefsrational inattentionShannon entropy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

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Cited in

(9)

• Proper scoring rules with general preferences: a dual characterization of optimal reports
• Obvious belief elicitation
• In search of good probability assessors: an experimental comparison of elicitation rules for confidence judgments
• Compatible weighted proper scoring rules
• The binarized scoring rule
• Dynamic belief elicitation
• Robust confidence distributions from proper scoring rules
• A new example for a proper scoring rule
• Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation

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